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TIAL TENANTS ON THE BASIS OF ECONOMIC CRITERIA WHICH
HAVE RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT-Boyd v. Lefrak

Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975).
In April of 1968, the highly controversial Fair Housing Act (Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) 1 was enacted. Title VIII prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex in
various transactions involving real property, regardless of whether
state action is found. 2 Two months later, the United States Supreme
Court, in Jones v.Alfred H. Mayer Co.,3 revived the use of a provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 4 which was enacted pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment. 5 The Court in Jones prohibited racial discrimination in private transactions concerning the sale or rental of
real or personal property. 6 While Title VIII and the Jones decision
1 Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 et seq. (1970)). The Fair Housing Act was an amendment made by the Senate to a
civil rights bill which had originated in the House. 113 CONG. REc. 22777-78 (1967); 114
CONG. REC. 2225, 2270-72, 5992, 5995-97, 9553-621 (1968). For an interesting and
informative account of the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act see Dubofsky, Fair
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969). For a
comprehensive overview of the Fair Housing Act see Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A
Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159 (1973); Friedman, Federal Fair Housing Practice, 20
PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1974, at 15; Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements:
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 748-71; Comment, Racial
Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289,
298-314 (1973).
2 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). In 1974 the Fair Housing Act was amended so as to
include sex as one of the proscribed classifications. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-383 § 527(b)(1) to (4), 88 Stat. 729.
3 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)). See 392
U.S. at 422-37.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See 392 U.S. 437-38. The Supreme Court determined
that "§ 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals" because it was
enacted by Congress pursuant to the power given it by the thirteenth amendment which
contains no state action limitations. Id. at 438-39.
6 392 U.S. at 413. The district court had initially determined that section 1982 only
applied when state action was involved. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115,
119 (E.D. Mo. 1966). This decision was subsequently affirmed by the circuit court. Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court, reversing
the circuit court decision, held
that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or
rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the
power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
392 U.S. at 413 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
The Jones decision was very controversial, and has evoked extensive comment. See,
e.g., Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89;
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have been called the "twin pillars" of "the freedom to seek and to
acquire decent housing on equal terms,"-7 the effectiveness of Title
VIII has been seriously questioned, 8 due to the lack of enforcement
powers given to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 9 Thus, the courts must assume an important and substantial
role in both private actions and suits brought by the Attorney General
in order to insure the effective implementation of the provisions of
Title VIII. 10
The Supreme Court has confronted a variety of tangential issues
Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 455,
485 (1969); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 455, 475 (1969).
7Brooke, Introduction to Symposium
Non-Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of
Real Property: Comments on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 22 VAND. L. REV. 455, 457 (1969). Senator Edward W. Brooke was one
of the co-sponsors of the fair housing amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 114
CONG. REC. 2272 (1968).
There are a variety of distinctions between the scope, coverage, enforcement
mechanism, limitation period, and remedies of section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act.
For a discussion of the interrelationship of these two statutory provisions see Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-17 (1968); Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of
Title VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REV. 455, 459 (1969); Note,Jones v. Mayer: The
Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
1019, 1027-54 (1969). It should be noted that the thirteenth amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 only prohibit racial discrimination and thus are much more limited in
scope than the fair housing provisions. It is still open to question whether Puerto Ricans
or other ethnic minorities would be considered racial minorities within the scope of
section 1982. See Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942, 943-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newbern
v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407, 411-12 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Chandler, supra note 1,
at 175 & n.114; Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 82
HARV 1. REV. 1294. 1315-18 (1969).
8 See generally Hearings on Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal
Opportunity in Housing Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomoi. (Subcomm. No. 4)
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-72) [hereinafter
cited as 1971-72 Hearings]; Hearings on De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]; Chandler, supra note 1; Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act,
1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 762-65.
9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-11, 3616 (1970). The Supreme Court has noted that
most of the fair housing litigation conducted by the Attorney General is handled by the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, which has less than
two dozen lawyers. Since HUD has no enforcement powers and since the enormity of the task of assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney General in
the matter minimal, the main generating force must be private suits ....
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
1i As the housing administrative process has not been entirely successful, Chandler,
supra note 1, at 192, it would appear that the alternative courses open are private suits, or
suits brought by the Attorney General, thus causing the final decisional burden to fall on
the courts.
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in the housing area." However, some important questions concerning the legal standards, evidentiary burdens, and presumptions to be
applied, have not yet been resolved.12 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Boyd v. Lefrak Organization,13 has attempted to
deal with some of these problems.
On August 6, 1970 the Attorney General of the United States
brought an action against The Lefrak Organization and Life Realty,
Inc. 1 4 based on an alleged pattern and practice 15 of noncompliance
11See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (a person bringing an action
for damages under the Fair Housing Act has a right to demand a jury trial); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 212 (1972) (the standing provision under
the Fair Housing Act is "broad" and includes "all in the same housing unit who are
injured by racial discrimination," including white tenants); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237-40 (1969) (damages may be awarded to a successful litigant
bringing an action under section 1982. A white person may be accorded standing to bring
an action under section 1982 in order to vindicate the rights of the injured person);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388 & n.1 (1969) (the Fair Housing Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 do not preempt state and local housing legislation which gives equivalent rights).
12 The legislative history of the Act does not appear to have concerned itself
with the
problems the judiciary would encounter in applying the Act. For an interesting commentary on these problems, which, when presented during the Senate floor debate evoked
little response, see 114 CONG. REC. 3241-42 (1968).
The Fair Housing Act does provide that "[iun any proceeding brought pursuant to
this section, the burden of proof shall be on the complainant." 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e)
(1970). Section 3610 is concerned with federal administrative enforcement, deference to
state and local agencies, and eventual federal court action if the other avenues of relief
fail. See note 27 infra. In Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1974), the court held
that the same burden of proof will apply in a section 3612 proceeding which involves
enforcement by private persons. The initial burden of proof is normally placed upon the
plaintiff as he is the party "who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and
who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof." C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 786 (2d ed. 1972).
13509 F.2d 1110, rehearingdenied, 517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 197
(1975). A petition for rehearing and a suggestion for a rehearing en banc was denied in
the court of appeals. Although the vote was 4 to 3 in favor of the rehearing, it was denied
as this did not constitute a majority of the judges in regular active service.
14 Within New York City, Lefrak operates 119 apartment buildings containing 15,484
apartments, with price ranges from $140 to $400 per month. 509 F.2d at 1111. Life Realty,
Inc. is the rental agent for some Lefrak apartment buildings which are located in Brooklyn and Queens. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 2, Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509
F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants).
1i The Fair Housing Act gives the Attorney General authority to bring a civil action
against any person whom he "has reasonable cause to believe . . . is engaged in a pattern
or practice of resistance to the" provisions of the Fair Housing Act or when a person's
rights under the Act have been denied "and such denial raises an issue of general public
importance." 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
"phrase 'a pattern or practice' " does limit the Attorney General's authority. Trafficante
v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972). At the very least, "pattern and
practice" demands more than one isolated act of discrimination. See United States v.
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with the Fair Housing Act.1 6 Although the defendants to that action
denied the allegations of the complaint, they agreed to a consent
order which remained in effect for two years.' 7 As part of the order,
Lefrak and Life Realty agreed to apply an objective financial criterion to all prospective tenants.' 8 In order to be eligible for housing, the prospective tenant's net weekly income, including the income of a spouse, must equal at least 90% of the month's rent. 19 In
applying this " '90% rule,' " an applicant's debts, taxes, and fixed obligations were deducted from gross income in order to calculate net
income. 2 0 Although not included in the consent order, the defendants
also employed a financial criterion, called the " 'co-signer
requirement,
whereby an applicant would be eligible to rent an
apartment if he could obtain a person to co-sign the lease. 2 ' It was
necessary for the weekly net income of the co-signer to equal at least
110% of the month's rent. 2 2 To determine the net income of the cosigner, in addition to the deduction of fixed payments and taxes, 2 3 a
spouse's income was not taken into account and the rent of said co2
signer was deducted as a fixed obligation. a
On July 7, 1971, Dorothy Boyd, a separated, black welfare recip25
ient with five children, attempted to rent a Lefrak apartment.

Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v.
West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gilman,
341 F. Supp. 891, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16 509 F.2d at 1112. The Government's action was based on allegations that discrimination had taken place because of
(1) defendants' false representations made to blacks and Puerto Ricans that they
bad no apartments available when, in fact, they did but were unwilling to rent
them to non-whites; (2) discrimination against persons in terms, conditions and
privileges in rental because of race, color or national origin; and (3) deliberately
channeling black applicants to selected apartment buildings while channeling
white persons only to other buildings, both under defendants' management.
Order Amending the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 846, Boyd v. Lefrak
Organization, Civ. No. 71-C-1433 (E.D.N.Y., filed April 22, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Amending Order].
17 509 F.2d at 1112.
18 Id. Also included in the order were agreements to adhere to the provisions of the
Fair Housing Act, to accept applicants regardless of race, and to maintain records as to
racial characteristics. Id.
1'Id.
at 1111. Lefrak had previously used a standard whereby one month's rent
should equal one week's gross income. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 6.
2 509 F.2d at 1111 & n.1.
21 Id. at 1111-12.
22
Id. at 1111.
23 Amending Order, supra note 16, at 844.
24509 F.2d at 1111 n.2.
2 Id. at 1111-12; Amending Order, supra note 16, at 846-48.
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Upon being refused an apartment, allegedly because she was a public
welfare recipient,16 Mrs. Boyd filed a complaint at the Department of
Justice. 2 7 When no results were forthcoming from this action, Mrs.
Boyd moved to intervene in the original action of the Department of
Justice. 2 8 This motion was denied, but Judge Weinstein of the district
29
court treated the motion as the commencement of a separate action.
Mrs. Boyd then filed an amended complaint 0 seeking injunctive and
26 509 F.2d at 1112 n.4. On appeal, Lefrak and Life Realty alleged that Mrs. Boyd was
denied an apartment because she wanted a two-bedroom apartment, which due to the
building's occupancy standards was too small for six occupants. Brief for Appellants,
supra note 14, at 4, 40-41.
27 Amending Order, supra note 16, at 847. An adminstrative complaint is filed with
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by an aggrieved person. 42 U.S.C. §
3610(a) (1970). The complaint must be filed within 180 days after the alleged discrimination has occurred. Id. § 3610(b). If the state or locality has fair housing laws which
provide substantially equivalent rights and remedies, the Secretary must notify and turn
over the case to the appropriate agency. The Secretary cannot proceed unless the local
agency fails to take any action. Id. § 3610(c). If after 30 days, there is a failure to obtain a
voluntary compliance or judicial remedy under local housing laws, the complainant has
30 more days to file a civil suit in the district court for appropriate relief. Id. § 3610(d).
28 509 F.2d at 1112.
29 Id. The consent decree was subsequently amended on December 22, 1971, over
Mrs. Boyd's objections. Amending Order, supra note 16, at 847. In the amended order,
Lefrak and Life Realty agreed to (1) treat non-recipients and recipients of public assistance in the same manner; (2) to distribute to recipients of public assistance a " 'Notice to
Welfare Recipients' " informing them of the ways in which they might be able to qualify
as a tenant; (3) to accept a governmental-agency rent guarantee on behalf of public
assistance recipients unable to comply with the 90% rule or the co-signer requirement.
509 F.2d at 1112 n.3. The program concerning government guarantees was never implemented. Id.
30 509 F.2d at 1112. In addition to Lefrak and Life Realty, Mrs. Boyd had originally
named the United States, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General as defendants. Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Among other allegations, it was contended that the Attorney General had approved and participated in the
allegedly discriminatory practices of Lefrak and Life Realty through the promulgation of
the original and amended consent orders. Id. at 792. The court dismissed the action as to
the three governmental defendants. Id. at 795.
The plaintiff originally pleaded two additional grounds for relief, one of which was
based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Amending Order, supra note 16,
at 845. The court found it unnecessary to'pass upon this contention. Id. at 862. On appeal
the issue was not raised by either party. The other claim was based on the allegation
"that governmental action is present through a consent order heretofore secured by the
Government." Id. at 845. This contention was never discussed by the trial court, but the
court of appeals noted that "[t]here is concededly no state action in this case." 509 F.2d at
1114 n.6. The Second Circuit has held that a classification based on welfare recipiency is
not rationally related to the ability to pay rent, and therefore violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616, 622-23
(2d Cir. 1972). Accord, Battle v. Municipal Housing Auth., 53 F.R.D. 423, 427-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 138-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, if state action had been present and the action had been brought
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declaratory relief based upon the fact that Lefrak's financial criteria
(the 90% rule and the co-signer requirement) violated the fair housing
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Civil Rights Act of
1866.31 Subsequently, Mrs. Boyd's motion to have her suit declared a
class action was granted. 3 2 On March 2, 1973, the district court
granted the motion of Lefrak and Life Realty, unopposed by the
Qovernment, to dissolve the consent decree and dismiss the
33
Government's action with prejudice.
The case was tried, without a jury, before Justice Tom C. Clark,
who found that the 90% rule excluded all recipients of public assistance as a class. 34 The court noted that 77% of those persons on public assistance in New York City were black or Puerto Rican, causing
the 90% rule to operate so as to exclude blacks and Puerto Ricans in
greater percentages than whites.3 5 The court also noted that the cosigner requirement had a discriminatory effect on blacks and Puerto
Ricans. 36 In addition, it was inferred that both of the financial criteria
under the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiffs in Boyd, in all probability, would have
succeeded without any allegation of racially discriminatory effect.
3, 509 F.2d at 1111.
32 Id. at 1112. The class was defined as
"all public assistance recipients within the New York Metropolitan Area who
have sought or may seek to rent accommodations in the residential buildings
owned or operated by the Lefrak interests."
Id. at 1111.
33 Id. at 1112. It should be noted, however, that the dismissal order "explicitly stated
that the dissolution was without prejudice to the instant action." Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees at 4, Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
3'iAmending Order, supa note 16, at 859. This finding of fact was dprived frnm
testimony of an expert produced by the plaintiffs who testified that to qualify under the
90% rule one would have to earn no less than $10,500 per year. Id. at 853. This minimum
income requirement would automatically disqualify anyone eligible for public assistance.
509 F.2d at 1114.
35 Amending Order, supra note 16, at 845, 859. The court found that in 1970, 72% of
the people who received public assistance in the New York City Community were black
and Puerto Rican while only 23% were white. Id. at 851. While only 3% of the white
population received assistance, 29% of the Puerto Rican and black residents received
welfare benefits. Id. By 1973, one-third of the black population and one-half of the
Puerto Rican population were on public assistance as compared with only 5% of the
white population. Id.
36 Id. at 859-60. In discussing the co-signer requirements the court had previously
noted:
It is difficult, if not impossible, for the average black or Puerto Rican applicant to secure a white guarantor or co-signor, and a very small percentage of these
races themselves can qualify. As a result, most blacks and Puerto Ricans cannot
meet either of defendants' requirements.
Id. at 851.
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had been applied in a discriminatory manner,3 7 in that "even among
the recipient-applicants with co-signers and completed applications,
the [proportion of] whites accepted [ran] three to one over the
blacks. 3' ' Although the court did not explicitly state whether it was
relying on the general discriminatory impact of the application of the
90% rule or the effective discriminatory impact due to the high proportion of minority welfare recipients, it held that the 90% rule did not
accurately measure the ability of public assistance recipients to pay
rent.39 The court also found that
there is no business necessity requiring the use of the defendants'
90 percent financial rule since a policy with less discriminatory impact would be quite sufficient to fully protect the defendants in
40
collecting their rent.
The district court granted the requested injunctive relief, finding that
the defendants had violated the Fair Housing Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.41
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one
holding, reversed the decision of the district court. 42 Judge Hays,
writing for the majority, stated that the issue was simply "whether or
not the financial criteria applied by defendants are violative of the
Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act." 43 The court held that
31 See id. at 852-56.
38 Id. at 854. The court found that the black rejection rate was from two to four times
greater than that of whites, id. at 855, and that
[o]ver all we find 34.7 percent of the whites qualifying while only 10.7 percent
of the black [sic] and 5.6 percent of the Puerto Ricans are able to do so.
Id. at 852-53.
39 Id. at 845, 860. The court found that the usual allocation made for various necessary living expenses did not apply to a recipient of public assistance because he pays no
taxes or medical expenses and is able to obtain food stamps and a variety of other benefits. Id. at 857-58. The court also pointed out that there are no upper limits on the rent
allowance received by a recipient, the only condition being approval from the New York
City Department of Social Services. Id. at 858-59. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-a
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75). The defendants argued on appeal that this was a worthless
safeguard, as there was no guarantee the money received by the recipient would be
applied to their rent and that, although a "two-party check" sometimes was issued, this
did not occur until the rent was already in arrears. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at
7-8.
40 Amending Order, supra note 16, at 860.
41Id. at 846, 861-62. It was not clear whether the district court also invalidated the
co-signer requirement, as the court's conclusions of law only discussed the invalidity of
the 90% rule. Id. at 860-62. But the Second Circuit reviewed the case as though both of
the financial criteria had been declared in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. 509 F.2d at 1111-12.
42 509 F.2d at 1115.
43 Id. at 1112 n.4.
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44
they were not.
The court of appeals found that the underlying basis of plaintiffs'
argument stemmed from their contention "that '[w]elfare recipiency
.. . must be seen as the "functional equivalent" of race,' "45 a premise
which the court stated had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 46
The majority opinion noted that the class was composed of all welfare
recipients, and thus viewed the plaintiffs' allegations only in that
context. 4 7 It then went on to hold that there was no evidence of
racially motivated discrimination in the implementation of the financial criteria.'8 The court found that (1) the percentage of blacks in the
apartment was 19.8% as compared with a 21% black population;4 9 (2)
there was no claim that black welfare recipients were treated any
differently than white recipients; 50 and (3) there was no evidence that

44Id. at 1114-15.

45 Id. at 1112 (quoting from Brief for Appellees, supra note 33, at 36). In response to
the court's quotation from their brief, the plaintiffs-appellees, in their petition for rehearing, stated that "[tihe majority was under a misapprehension by the basic nature of
petitioners' claims." Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en banc of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 12, Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975). It
was pointed out that the majority never considered their argument concerning the discriminatory effect of the financial criteria on the black and Puerto Rican population in
general. Id.
46 509 F.2d at 1112 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)). In Jaines, the
Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the California constitution which provided that
a local referendum be held before a low-rent housing project could be acquired, developed, or constructed by the state in that locality. 402 U.S. at 142-43. The Court found
that the amendment did not rest on racial distinctions and that the traditional and common use of referendums in California negated "any claim that a law seemingly neutral on
its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority." Id. at 141.
47 509 F.2d at 1111. Although the class was composed of welfare recipients, the
plaintiffs did allege an overall racially discriminatory effect. See note 45 supra. Cf.
Amending Order, supra note 16, at 852-53.
4 509 F.2d at 1113.
49 Id. Commenting upon this finding, Judge Mansfield, in his dissent, stated:
The majority's statement that 19.8% of appellants' apartments are rented to
Blacks is open to question. It assumes that once an apartment was rented to a
Black family the occupancy did not thereafter change to a white family. The
figure was also based only on appellants' Brooklyn buildings.
Id. at 1118 n.4 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
5o Id. at 1113 (majority opinion). This finding was contrary to the facts as accepted by
Judge Mansfield. He stated that
the evidence before the trial judge further disclosed that of the public assistance
recipients who applied to appellants for apartments the percentage of nonminority appellants [sic] who were accepted was approximately twice the percentage of Black applicants accepted.
Id. at 1118 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the sample from which
Judge Mansfield derived those statistics was very small, i.e., six blacks of whom two were
accepted, and eight whites of whom six were accepted. Amending Order, supra note 16,
at 853-54.
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the exclusion of recipients of public assistance was for any reason
other than economics. 5 1 Thus, the fact that blacks were excluded
from the Lefrak apartments in a higher proportion than whites was
seen simply as a matter of economics, rather than racially motivated
discrimination. 5 2 The court stated that a private landlord could discriminate in the choice of his tenants in any manner as long as the
criteria used were not based on one of the statutorily condemned
classifications. 53 The court noted that a landlord could seek assurances
to ascertain to his satisfaction the prospective tenant's ability to pay
5 4
the rent.
The crucial question involved in this case was the legal standard
the court of appeals was to apply. The court employed a subjective or
purpose standard which requires proof by the plaintiff that the allegedly discriminatory conduct is racially motivated. 55 The use of this
standard appears to be supported by language employed by the Supreme Court in Jones, wherein the Court stated that section 1982,
which is derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act, "was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations" in the sale or rental of
56
property.
Due to the fact that direct evidence of racially motivated discrimination is so difficult to obtain, 5 7 the courts have had to develop
objective criteria to aid them in determining a person's subjective
motivation. 5 8 Although this type of approach is couched in objective
terms, it is still a method by which one may inferentially impute
racial motivation.
Objective criteria were developed and applied in Bush v. Kaim , 9
51 509 F.2d at 1113.
52 Id.

53 Id. at 1114.
54 ld.
55 Id. at 1113. The court stated that only in actions arising tinder the equal protection
clause, where a preliminary finding of state action is necessary, will "a showing of a
disproportionate effect" on a racial minority be sufficient to invoke the compelling state
interest test. Id.
56 392 U.S. at 426 (emphasis in original).
57 In Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425
F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), the court noted "that most persons will not admit publicly that
they entertain any bias or prejudice against members of the Negro Race or other minority
races.
5 See discussion of Bush .'. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969), notes 59-65
infra and accompanying text, and United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp.
776 (N.D. Miss. 1972), notes 75-78 infra and accompanying text.
59 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969). See also Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.

Supp. 407, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Comment, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289, 293-94 (1973).
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a case brought under section 1982 alone. 60 The black plaintiffs
had attempted to rent a single family dwelling which had been advertised in the newspaper. 61 The court held that for a plaintiff to
sustain his burden of proof he must establish
(1) that the owner (or responsible party) placed the property on the
open market for sale or rental, (2) that the plaintiff was willing to
rent or purchase the property on the terms specified by the owner,
(3) the plaintiff communicated this willingness to the owner at a
time when the property was available for sale or rent, (4) that the
owner refused to rent or sell the property to the plaintiff on the
terms which the owner indicated would otherwise be satisfactory,
and (5) that there is no apparent reason for the refusal of the defendant to rent the property to the plaintiff other than the
62
plaintiff's race.

When evidence is presented which supports these elements, the defendant is permitted to come forward to rebut the evidence. 63 In the
event that the defendant is unable to overcome his burden of disproving the evidence which establishes the objective criteria, he may
nevertheless present evidence that he, in fact, based his refusal to
sell or rent on other legitimate considerations. 64 The court stated that
one could refuse to rent for any reason, even if totally subjective, as
long as the refusal was actually based on the subjective justifications
and not on the racial characteristics of the person involved. 65
297 F. Supp. at 154.
at 154-55. Single family dwellings sold through newspaper advertisements
were not covered by the Fair Housing Act until after December 31, 1969. See 42 U.S.C. §
3603(b)(1) (1970).
62 297 F. Supp. at 162. Accord, Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942, 944 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
63 297 F. Supp. at 162.
64 Id. at 163. The court stated that a person may consider such factors as credit
standing, assets, reputation, age, number of children and their ages, financial stability,
size of family, and length of time wanted for occupancy, but noted that this was by no
means an exclusive list. Id. at 162-63.
In Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 115 (4th Cir. 1974), a suit arising under § 1982
and the Fair Housing Act, the defendant established that his refusal to sell was based on
tax reasons and not race. But in Hall v. Freitas, 343 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
the court rejected defendant's claim that his refusal to rent was based on plaintiff's
misrepresentation concerning the length of his employment.
65 297 F. Supp. at 162-63. The court took note of such subjective factors as appearance, demeanor, and a first-impression opinion as to trustworthiness. Id. See also Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1973).
This approach appears to be supported by a statement made during hearings on the
Fair Housing Act by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark wherein he remarked that the
legislation
would prohibit no one from selling or renting to a relative or to a friend. There is
60

61 Id.
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The court in Bush did not make it clear whether racial motivation must be the sole reason or whether it only has to be one of the
considerations in order to constitute a violation of the prohibition
against racial discrimination. This question was clarified in Smith v.
Sol D. Adler Realty Co. ,6'6 a suit in which the action was based on an
alleged violation of section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act. 6 7 Plaintiff,
a separated black woman with a child, attempted to sublet an
apartment. 68 Although the tenant was willing to sublet the apartment
to the plaintiff, the president of the corporation that managed the
apartment building refused, stating that the company had a policy of
not renting to single employed mothers with young children. 69 The
court held
that race is an impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision
and that it cannot be brushed aside because it was neither the sole
reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination. We
find no acceptable place in the law for partial racial discrimination. 70
Recognizing that discrimination

is often

practiced

in subtle

forms, 71 the courts have also made use of statistical data in establishing a prima facie case under the subjective approach. 72 This technothing in this bill to prevent personal choice where personal choice, not discrimination, is the real reason for action.
Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114 and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
But in Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir.
1972), the court, although recognizing that one has a right to refuse to rent "on any honest
basis unrelated to . . . race," noted that when an

asserted justification is itself somewhat arbitrary, it is particularlyimportant that
the trier of fact consider all admissible evidence that may illuminate the real
motivation of the defendants.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). Accord, Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83-84 (4th Cir.
1973).
66 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
67 Id. at 345.
68 Id. at 346.
9 Id. at 346-47.
70 Id.
at 349-50 (emphasis in original). Accord, Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d
380, 383 (10th Cir. 1973); Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1972);
Hampton v. Roberts, 386 F. Supp. 609, 611 (W.D. Va. 1974).
71 United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
72 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970), a case
arising under Title VII, is often cited as an authority in housing cases when statistics are
used. See, e.g., Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1202 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd and
modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss. 1972). See generally Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial
Statistics in FairHousing Cases, 34 MD. L. REv. 59 (1974).
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nique has been used frequently in the area of employment
discrimination. 73 The courts will look to the percentage of minority
buyers or tenants who have bought or rented from a defendant and
compare it with the percentage of minority persons in the surrounding geographical area. 7a For example, in United States v. Real Estate
Development Corp. ,'75 the court found that the fact that the defendants had never had a black tenant while the population in the area
was 37.6% black, "constitutes, at least, a prima facie case of racial
discrimination." 76 Once this case had been established, the burden
was placed upon the defendant to show that his actions were not
racially motivated. 77 As the defendant failed to sustain his burden of
rebutting the case, the court granted the requested relief. 78
Since the plaintiffs in Boyd could not meet the objective renting
standards (the 90% rule or the co-signer requirement) employed by
Lefrak, 79 they did not meet the requirements of the test set out in
the Bush case. 80 Similarly, the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of the statistical data analysis because there was not a large
enough discrepancy between the percentage of minority persons in
the Lefrak buildings in Brooklyn and that in the surrounding geographical area. 81 Thus, under either approach, the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racially motivated discrimination so as to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Perhaps this
is why the majority opinion did not directly discuss their application.
In effect, the court was compelled to look to direct evidence of ra73 See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 854 (1973); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See also Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment
Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235, 268-73 (1971).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.D.
Miss. 1972). It has been suggested that, to be totally accurate in determining the relevant
percentages, one must take into consideration the percentage of persons able to afford the
housing and their associational preferences. See Bogen & Falcon, supra note 72, at 70-73.
75 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
76 Id. at 779, 782. See also United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir.

1972); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649-50 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
aff'd and modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
In other cases, the statistical data has been looked at as one factor in conjunction
with the other evidence presented. See, e.g., Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d
1197, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1974); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83 (4th Cir. 1973);
Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Stpp. 407, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
77 347 F. Supp. at 782.
78 Id. at 782, 785.

79 509 F.2d at 1111-12.
80 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
81 See 509 F.2d at 1113.
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cially motivated discrimination, which was found not to exist. 82
Plaintiffs' primary contention, which had been the basis of Justice
Clark's decision8 3 and the dissenting opinion of Judge Mansfield of
the court of appeals, 8 4 was that the business necessity test, developed
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,85 was applicable. 86 This test requires
that employment practices be related to job performance. 8 7 The majority opinion of the court of appeals in Boyd rejected this contention,
commenting that the business necessity test "has never been applied
in any Fair Housing Act case, either public or private, and we find it
'8 8
to be inapposite here. "
2

8 1d. at 1113-15.

s3Amending Order, supra note 16, at 845-46, 861.
84509 F.2d at 1115.
85 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of the Griggs case see Blumrosen, Strangers
in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,
71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.
L. REV. 844 (1972).
86509 F.2d at 1114. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 33, at 31-43.

The four judges who dissented in the denial of the petition for rehearing in Boyd
agreed that the issue of the applicability of the principles enunciated in Griggs to the
Fair Housing Act is one of extreme importance. 517 F.2d at 919.
87 401 U.S. at 436.

88 509 F.2d at 1114. In finding Griggs "inapposite," the majority indicated that support for its reasoning could be found in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972),
wherein the Texas system of allocating welfare payments was challenged. Id. at 536-38.
In holding against the plaintiffs, the Court in Jefferson discussed whether the actions of
the state violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), which
prohibits discrimination in federally financed programs, 406 U.S. at 549-50 n.19, and
remarked that
[i]n Griggs, the employment tests having racially discriminatory effects were
found not to be job-related .... Since the Texas procedure challenged here is
related to the purposes of the welfare programs, it is not proscribed by Title VI
simply because of variances in the racial composition of the different categorical
programs.
Id. at 550 n.19 (emphasis in original).
It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit did apply the Griggs standard in
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974), a case arising under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
Plaintiffs challenged the guest regulation of a swim club, alleging that it was, racially
discriminatory. 495 F.2d at 1335. The court found that the club was not a private club as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970) and thus was not exempted from the application of
the Civil Rights Act. 495 F.2d at 1336. In vacating the summary judgment for the defendants, the court stated:
As in Griggs .. . such a rule or rule change is facially neutral. If, however, we
look to its effect, then it may no longer be neutral. In Griggs it was shown that
such a requirement weeded out blacks disproportionately to the population at
large. This shifts the burden of justifying the requirement onto the employer.
Here it might be shown that the rule change had the effect of discriminating
against blacks, because apparently none of the relatives and few of the friends of
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The issue in Griggs centered around the standard to be applied
in determining whether the requirement of a high school diploma or
passing a general intelligence test as a condition of employment violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964)89 when these seemingly neutral criteria operated

to disproportionately exclude black applicants. 90 The Supreme Court
stated that the court of appeals had "concluded that a subjective test
of the employer's intent should govern." 9 1 Rejecting the use of this
test, the Court stated:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job per92
formance, the practice is prohibited.
The Court decided that an objective standard should be implemented whereby racially motivated intent would not be determinative. 93 In applying an objective standard, the Court resolved the
conflict in the lower federal courts concerning the subjective versus
the objective approach in the judicial application of Title VII. 94 It was
decided that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." 9 5 Once
members were black .... This would presumably shift the burden of justifying
the change by showing that the rule was actually adopted for a reasonable purpose and not for discriminatory purposes.
Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). Judge Oakes, in his dissent from the denial of the petition
for rehearing in Boyd, stated that one of his reasons for believing a rehearing should be
granted was dhe "direct conflict" between the ,-]kon in Olzman and Boyd. 517 F.2d
at 919.
00
89 42 U.S.C. § 20
e (1970), as amended, (Supp. III 1974).
90 401 U.S. at 425-26.
9' Id. at 428.
92 Id. at 431.
93Id. at 432.
94 Compare Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), with
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972) and Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See Comment, The Validity of Employment
Testing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 388, 397-98; Recent Decisions, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 270, 272
(1972); Case Comment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 381, 388 (1971). As one commentator
aptly stated:
Griggs redefines discrimination in terms of consequence rather than motive,
effect rather than purpose. This definition is new to the field of employment
discrimination, in which a subjective test had previously been used.
Blumrosen, supra note 85, at 62.
95 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in original).
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it is shown that the employment practice operates in a manner which
excludes blacks in a higher proportion than non-minority groups, the
burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the employment practice is job related and a business necessity. 96 In the application of the business necessity standard, the Court looked primarily at
the exclusionary effect on the minority population, not simply the
percentage of minority persons employed in the defendants' work
force. 97 Although employment testing and a high school diploma requirement were the immediate employment practices under review,
98
the Supreme Court's holding is couched in very broad language,
and has been interpreted to apply to other types of employment
99
practices.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 10 0 the Supreme Court
clarified its position on the standards to be applied in cases involving
allegations of employment discrimination. 10 1 McDonnell did not involve an employer's implementation of a facially neutral employment
procedure, but rather, was an action brought by a single former employee who alleged that the defendant's refusal to rehire him was raId. at 431.
9 Id. at 430-31 & n.6. See Blumrosen, supra note 85, at 91-93. Blumrosen notes that
there are two types of statistical evidence which may cause the burden to be shifted to
the defendant:
(1) proof that particular employment standards will exclude a higher proportion
of minorities than of the majority group, and (2) proof that the composition of
defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.
Id. at 92. It was noted that the Griggs Court utilized the first type of statistical evidence.
Id. See 401 U.S. at 431. The second type of statistical evidence is generally considered in
establishing a prima facie case in cases employing a subjective standard of racial motivation. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text. A court employing the subjective
approach, and thus being unconcerned with "effect," would consider the exclusion of
minorities irrelevant. In fact, the majority in Boyd did find such statistical evidence
inapposite. 509 F.2d at 1113. See generally Comment, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 909-12 (1972).
98 The Court utilized such phraseology as "practices, procedures, or tests" and "employment procedures or testing mechanisms." 401 U.S. at 430, 432.
"See Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 45, 53, 56-57 (5th Cir.
1974) (seniority rules and a policy whereby one was required to resign from one job
before being allowed to apply for another); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674,
676-77 (8th Cir. 1974) (rule establishing that employee cannot have his wages garnished
more than once in one year); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 873, 879
(6th Cir. 1973) (seniority and transfer policy). See also Wilson, supra note 85, at 849-51;
Note, Employment Discrimination: The Burden Is On Business, 31 MD. L. REV. 255,
267-68 (1971).
'-0 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a discussion of the McDonnell case see 1973-74 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 1105, 1211-18 (1974); Note,
15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 654 (1974).
101 411 U.S. at 800-06.
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cially motivated.10 2 The "critical issue" was seen as "the order and
allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination. "103
The Court held that the plaintiff must initially carry the burden
of proof. 10 4 Although declining to adopt an absolute rule,' 0 5 the
Court noted that a plaintiff could establish "a prima facie case of racial
discrimination" by proving
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 106
The Court also noted that a relevant factor would be the racial composition of the defendant's work force. ' 0 7 Once the prima facie case
was established, the employer would have the burden "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection. '"108 The Court went on to explain that the business necessity test of Griggs was not the proper standard to apply in
a facially neutral testing
McDonnell, since the latter did not involve
09
device whose effect was to exclude blacks. 1
Griggs and McDonnell appear to stand for the proposition that,
in the employment area, two different legal standards are to be applied. Broadly speaking, in a situation where a facially neutral practice is being challenged, the standards set forth in Griggs would be
appropriate, 110 while in an individual suit challenging one particular
allegedly discrin-anatory act, LUllt'
The standard articulated in McDonnell is almost identical to the
102 Id.

at 794.
Id. at 800.
104 Id. at 802.
105Id. at 802 n.13.
106Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
107 Id.
at 805 & n.19. Compare id. with Griggs, wherein the crucial factor was the
racial composition of the excluded work force. See note 97 supra. See generally Fiss,
supra note 73, at 270-73.
108 411 U.S. at 802.
109Id. at 802 n. 14, 805-06.
110 See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,
421 U.S. 987 (1975); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975),
vacated mem., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975).
11 See, e.g., Franklin v. Troxel Mfg. Co., 501 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
103
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subjective tests applied in previously discussed housing cases such
as Bush"12 and Real Estate Development Corp.113 This line of housing
cases, like McDonnell, places the initial burden on the plaintiff Certain factors, which may include the racial composition of the defendant's work force or of the tenants residing in his apartment building,
establish a prima facie case. Once established, the defendant must
rebut the inference by satisfactorily denying racial motivation. 1 4 A
logical progression of this correlation would seem to be that when the
plaintiffs in a housing case challenge a facially neutral policy or practice that the legal standards enunciated in Griggs should apply.
Judge Mansfield, in his dissent in Boyd, took issue with the
majority's application of the subjective racial motivation test as applied in an action challenging a facially neutral rule. 115 He favored
the use of the objective "effect" approach articulated in Griggs, stating:
This case should be governed by the principle, firmly established by the Supreme Court in its interpretation and enforcement
of analogous civil rights legislation, to the effect that, where a facially neutral practice has a serious and substantial de facto discriminatory impact, it prima facie violates a statutory prohibition
against racial discrimination unless the alleged violator can show
that the practice is necessary for non-racial reasons. 116
Judge Mansfield reasoned that the purpose of the Fair Housing Act
was identical to that of Title VII "to eliminate artificial and arbitrary
barriers." 117 He did not question the landlord's right to "adopt
reasonably appropriate economic standards," 1 1 8 just as the Supreme
Court in Griggs did not question the fact that "Congress did not intend by Title VII .. .to guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications. '" 119 As the business necessity test focuses on effect, the
120
relevant statistical data is drawn from the population excluded,
thereby causing the statistical data on the racial composition within
the apartment buildings to lose its significance. In applying this test
to the fact situation in Boyd, Judge Mansfield found that the 90% rule
112

297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969). See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.

113347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
114 Compare

notes 59-65 and 75-78 supra and accompanying text with notes 100-08

supra and accompanying text.
115509 F.2d at 1115.
116Id. (emphasis in original).
1
17Id. at 1116.
118 Id.
119 401 U.S. at 430.
120 See note 97 supra.
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operated so as to have a disproportionately high exclusionary impact
on minorities, 12 1 that the rule was not reasonably related to one's
ability to pay rent 1 22 and that it was not a business necessity.123
Although the majority opinion stated that no case arising under
the Fair Housing Act had ever applied the business necessity test of
Griggs,124 it should be noted that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in Williams v. Matthews Co.,125 did apply the standards
enunciated in Griggs to a private housing case. 12 6 In Williams, an
121509 F.2d at 1117. Judge Mansfield noted that all but a few welfare recipients were
excluded by the implementation of the 90% rule. Id. He agreed with the appellees that
"[t]o exclude public assistance recipients in New York City is the equivalent of excluding
minority persons." Id. Judge Mansfield, as did Justice Clark, went beyond the class of
welfare recipients and noted the discriminatory impact of the 90% rule on the population
at large. Id. at 1117-18.
12 2
1d. at 1118. Judge Mansfield noted that a welfare recipient's rent allowance "is
not fixed at a specific figure but is equal to the recipient's actual rent when approved."
Id. He acknowledged that a recipient may receive various other welfare benefits and
concluded by stating:
The ability of welfare recipients to pay Lefrak rents is also attested to by the
existence, unknown to Lefrak, of some 461 welfare-recipient households in its
apartments in 1972 and the fact that, out of 15,484 Lefrak apartments, only 108
dispossess notices were issued in 1972 and 43 in 1973.
Id.
123Id. at 1118. Judge Mansfield stated that "business necessity" had not been established, as
[t]here was no showing.., that experience in the rental of apartments of the type
here under consideration had demonstrated that the 90% Rule was reasonably
necessary to insure tenants' payment of rent and that there had been losses,
substantial defaults, or failure to collect back rental payments under less stringent rules. Nor was there proof that welfare recipients as tenants have a greater
incidence of rent failures or defaults than other tenants.
Id.

It should be noted that, in addition to the elements of racially discriminatory effect
and the absence of job relatedness and business necessity, the Supreme Court in Griggs
considered a third element-that "the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by
white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites." 401
U.S. at 426 (footnote omitted). On appeal, Lefrak and Life Realty argued that there was no
evidence of past discrimination. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 17-18. However,
both Judge Mansfield and Justice Clark took into consideration the implication of the fact
that previously the Government had instituted suit against the defendants for an alleged
pattern and practice of racial discrimination. 509 F.2d at 1117 n.3; Amending Order,
supra note 16, at 846.
124 509 F.2d at 1114.
125 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 1027 (1974).
126499 F.2d at 828. See also Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 117-20 (4th Cir. 1974)
(Butzner, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit applied a variation of the Griggs test in United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656 (1975), a case involving a governmental defendant. In Black Jack, an action was brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act
challenging the city's zoning ordinance. 508 F.2d at 1181. Relying on Griggs and
Williams, the court held that a prima facie case would be established by demonstrating a
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action was brought against the Matthews Company alleging violations
of sections 1981 and 1982 and the Fair Housing Act. 127 The plaintiffs,
who had attempted to buy a lot from the defendant, had been told
that it was a company rule to sell only to approved builders. It was
contended at trial that the justification for this policy was to insure a
regulated development of the subdivision.12 8 The plaintiffs attempted
to engage an approved builder, but were unsuccessful because the
builder believed that he would suffer business losses if he constructed
a house in that subdivision for black people.' 2 9 The plaintiffs finally
found a black builder willing to do the job, only to learn that he was
130
unacceptable to the company because he had not been approved.
At the trial level the court held that race had not been a factor in the
defendant's refusal to sell the property to the plaintiff "and that
plaintiff was afforded the same opportunity as others to purchase from
an approved builder. -''
It was additionally held that the approved
132
builder requirement was justified by legitimate business reasons.
In reversing the holding of the district court, the court of appeals
discussed the principles of a prima facie case as applied in McDonnell
and various housing cases. 133 The court stated that when a prospective black purchaser meets the objective requirements of a seller, and
no lots in a subdivision have been sold to a black person, a prima
facie case of racial discrimination will arise as a matter of law. 134 This
shifts the burden onto the defendant to establish a legitimate reason
35
for his action. 1
racially discriminatory effect. Id. at 1184-85. But rather than requiring the defendant to
rebut the prima facie case by proving business necessity the court stated:
Even though this case is based on a federal statute, rather than on the Fourteenth
Amendment, we believe that, once the United States established a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, it became proper to apply the compelling governmental interest requirement of the equal protection cases.
Id. at 1185 n.4. Accord, Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp. 228, 232-34
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
127
128

499 F.2d at 822.
Id. at 824. The action was originally brought as both an individual and a class

action, but the class action was dismissed due to the lack of evidence establishing that
other black persons attempted to buy property from the defendant. Id. at 829.
129
130

Id. at 824.
Id.

131 Id. at 825. The Williamses also tried to engage a second white builder who refused to build for them. Id. at 824. Apparently there was a conflict as to whether the board
of directors or the president of the company approved or disapproved the builders, but
it was established that there was no set procedure by which a builder could gain approval. Id.
132 See id. at 825.
133Id. at 826.
4

13

135

Id.
Id. at 827.
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The court could have ended the discussion at this point, as it was
apparent that it did not believe the defendant's evidence established
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its refusal to sell to the
plaintiffs. 136 Yet, the court went firther and noted that the courts
must take notice of the actual results of a facially neutral practice,
regardless of motivation.' 3 7 The court applied the Griggs test by stating that "such a policy, even though neutral on its face, cannot stand
138
if it in its operation serves to discriminate on the basis of race."'
The trial court's suggestion, that the approved builder requirement
was justified by business reasons, was rejected.' 3 9 The court of appeals held that
[i]n order to rely upon a "business necessity" justification for a business policy which, though fair in form, is discriminatory in operation, a defendant must demonstrate the absence of any acceptable
alternative that will accomplish the same business goal with less
discrimination. 140
141
After pointing out various alternatives available to the defendant,
the court concluded that the business justification advanced by the
14 2
defendant was "pure chimera."'
Although the Williams case involved a facially neutral rule, unlike Boyd it was not based upon economic distinctions. 143 Section
136 Id.

at 828.

137 Id.

138Id. There have been other housing cases where the courts have looked to the
effect of the challenged actions, rather than to the motivation. See, e.g., United States
v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Some cases have cited Griggs as
nuthority fnr looking at the effect rather than the purpose, but have not applied the
business necessity test. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp.
544, 548 (W.D. Va. 1975); United States v. Long, P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING

13,361 (C.D.S.C. 1974); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
139 499 F.2d at 828.

140Id.

141Id. The court suggested that the "Company could sell building lots directly to
black persons who indicate a willingness to hire an available competent contractor" or in
the alternative that the company "direct that its approved builders make the building lots
they buy from Matthews available without discrimination." Id.
142 Id. (footnote omitted).
143 It should be noted that there is another distinction between Boyd and Williams.
In Williams, the suit was brought individually and as a class action composed of black
persons. Id. at 822. The class action was dismissed due to the failure to establish a class.
Id. at 829. In Boyd, although racial discrimination was a basis of the action, the class was
composed of welfare recipients. 509 F.2d at 1111. See note 33 supra. Due to the fact that
welfare recipiency is not a classification which is proscribed by section 1982 or the Fair
Housing Act, it is possible that the majority opinion in Boyd took a more circumscribed
view of the action than it would have if the suit had been brought as a class action
composed of black persons. See 509 F.2d at 1112.
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1982 and the Fair Housing Act were not meant to prohibit economic
inequality in housing. 144 Nevertheless, acceptable economic standards
and business policies have been criticized as nothing more than "a subterfuge for racial discrimination.'1 4 5 In cases where a general business
or economic policy is challenged as being racially discriminatory, the
problems of proof become far more difficult since the justifications for
such policies are so readily accepted as being legitimate. 1 4 6 The use
of an objective test would alleviate this problem of proof as the focus
of the inquiry is directed toward the effect of the action rather than
the purpose. Once a business practice is challenged, and a racially
discriminatory effect is proven by the plaintiff, the defendant would
simply have to prove that the challenged practice is necessarily related to the realization of the expected return on his investment. Although to place this burden on the businessman is certainly more
onerous than the usual evidentiary burdens placed upon a defendant,
in this particular situation the defendant would more typically be an
organization capable of implementing and applying general business
and economic policies as contrasted with the small businessman who,
as a practical matter, does not institute and carry out such broadbased policies. In cases involving smaller businessmen, whose actions, rather than their business practices, were challenged, the proof
would continue to be directed toward ultimately proving, perhaps inferentially, racial motivation. To place the burden of establishing bus144The Supreme Court in Jones

v.Alfred H. Mayer Co. stated that
[a]t the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can
buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live.
392 U.S. at 443. Similarly, with regard to the Fair Housing Act, Senator Brooke, a cosponsor of the fair housing amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, during the floor
debate, stated:
I emphasize that the basic purpose of this legislation is to permit people who
have the ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public if they can afford
to buy it. It would not overcome the economic problem of those who could not
afford to purchase the house of their choice.
114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968).
1451971-72 Hearings,supra note 9, at 119. It has been said that
[c]ertain new and more subtle forms of discrimination in housing have been
devised: some apartments are not rented to persons whose wages are based on
an hourly scale; credit and other criteria are arbitrarily applied; false waiting lists
are maintained ....These new types of discrimination, while defying detection
by unsophisticated buyers or renters, continue to perpetuate a segregated living
pattern and dual housing markets.
Chandler, supra note 1, at 169 (footnote omitted). See generally 1971-72 Hearings, supra
note 9, at 118-22, 211-12; 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 2947-48.
146See Recent Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1631, 1633-35 (1975).
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iness necessity on the "entrepreneur" is to place it on the shoulders
of the person in the best position to be aware of, and able to establish, the policies and practices of the marketplace. 147
Ann GrafMcCornick
147 In 1971, President Nixon, commenting upon the Fair Housing Act, noted that
although the Act was not meant to effectuate " 'economic integration,' " economic measures would not be tolerated as a disguise for racial discrimination. Statement by the
President on Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Opportunity, June 11, 1971,
P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 5121, at 5127. He went on to state:
When such an action is called into question, we will study its effect. If the
effect of the action is to exclude Americans from equal housing opportunity on
the basis of their race, religion or ethnic background, we will vigorously oppose
it by whatever means are most appropriate-regardless of the rationale which
may have cloaked the discriminatory act.
Id. at 5128 (emphasis added).

